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RECENT CASES
Securities Regulation - Securities Fraud Accountants and Accounting - An Independent
Public Accounting Firm is Liable to Injured
Investors for Aiding and Abetting a Violation of
Rule 10b-5 if it is Negligent in Performing an
Audit Pursuant to Section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs, investors in securities, brought suit for damages, alleging that defendant Ernst and Ernst, an independent public accounting firm, had negligently performed an audit, which violated
both its common-law duty and its statutory duties pursuant to section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (1934 Act) and
Rule 17a-5 2 promulgated thereunder. Plaintiffs had invested in a
1. Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act], 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970), provides:
(a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or dealer
who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member, every
registered securities association, and every broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 78o of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records, and make such reports,
as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. Such accounts, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, books, and other such records shall be subject at any time or from
time to time to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners
or other representatives of the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1974), passed pursuant to section 17(a) of the 1934
Act, in pertinent part provides:
(a) Filing reports.
(2) Every member, broker or dealer subject to this rule shall file reports of
financial condition containing the information required by Form X-17A-5. . ..
(b)

Nature and form of reports. . ..
(1) The report of a member, broker or dealer shall be certified by a certified
public accountant or a public accountant who shall in fact be independent

(g)

Accountant's certificate
(2)

Representationsas to audit. The accountant's certificate (i) shall contain
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spurious escrow account on the advice of Lestor Nay, President of
First Securities Company of Chicago,3 whose fraud on plaintiffs was
facilitated by the use of a "mail rule" by which no employee was
permitted to open any mail addressed to Nay or marked for his
attention, regardless of the duration of Nay's absence from the
office. 4 To comply with the reporting requirements of section 17(a),
defendant was hired by First Securities to audit and certify the
financial reports it was required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Rule 17a-5 in accordance with the
guidelines established by SEC Form X-17A-5. Plaintiffs claimed
that defendant's negligent failure to discover or disclose the mail
rule was a failure to comply with generally accepted auditing standards, which caused their injury, giving rise to both a common-law
action for negligent misrepresentation and a statutory cause of action for aiding and abetting a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934
a reasonably comprehensive statement as to the scope of the audit made, including a statement as to whether the accountant reviewed the procedures followed
for safeguarding the securities of customers, and including, if with respect to
significant items in the report covered by the certificate any auditing procedures
generally recognized as normal have been omitted, a specific designation of such
procedures and of reasons for their omission, (ii) shall state whether the audit
was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards applicable
in the circumstances; and (iii) shall state whether the audit made omitted any
procedure deemed necessary by the accountant under the circumstances of the
particular case.
(h) Accountant's certificate; options to be expressed. The accountant's certificate shall
state clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial statement covered by the certificate and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein.
3. Plaintiffs had invested approximately $972,500 in the escrow account between 1942
and 1966. The fraud was not discovered until 1968 when Nay confessed in a suicide note. In
SEC v. First Securities Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1972) the court held that
Nay's conduct violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
4. None of the payments to the spurious account were zeflected on the financial records
of First Securities as all the payments were made payable to Nay or to a bank for his account.
Nay paid the "interest" by personal checks.
5. The introduction to SEC Form X-17A-5, for 1967, states in part:
The audit shall be made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and
shall include a review of the accounting system, the internal accounting control and
procedures for safeguarding securities including appropriate tests thereof for the period
since the prior examination date. It shall include all procedures necessary under the
circumstances to substantiate the assets and liabilities and securities and commodities
positions as of the date of the responses to the financial questionnaire and to permit the
expression of an opinion by the independent public accountant as to the financial condition of the respondent at that date. . ..
Since 1967 the introductory paragraph has been amended, increasing the scope of the audit,
but the language quoted above has been retained. See CCH FED. SEc. L. RP.
33,938 at
22,813-14 (1974).
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Act' and Rule 10b-5 7 thereunder.8 Defendant contended, inter alia,'

that it owed no common-law duty to plaintiffs and that it could not
have aided or abetted Nay's 10b-5 violation because it had no
knowledge of the fraudulent escrow scheme and no causal connection existed between its conduct and plaintiffs' injury. Finding no
genuine issue of material fact, the district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. An independent public accountant is liable for aiding and
abetting a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5
when his negligent breach of the duty of inquiry and disclosure
implicit in section 17(a) and Rule 17a-5 facilitates an underlying
fraud Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
I.

BACKGROUND

Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19340 requires
that broker-dealers make reports of their financial condition to the
SEC. Rule 17a-5,"1 implementing section 17(a), further requires that
these reports be audited in accordance with generally accepted au6. Section 10 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
7. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), passed pursuant to section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ....
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
8. Plaintiffs also asserted that defendant had a duty to detect and report First Securities' noncompliance with Rule 27(c) of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
See note 48 infra.
9. Defendant also contended that plaintiffs were estopped by their conduct prior to the
lawsuit and that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See note 49
infra.
10. See note 1 supra.
11. See note 2 supra.
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diting standards and be certified by an independent public
accountant. SEC Form X-17A-5, 2 which provides a more detailed
explanation of Rule 17a-5 requirements, states that the audit must
include a review of the system of internal accounting controls. This
requirement was expanded by SEC Release No. 8172,11 which requires that the auditor also comment on any material inadequacy
found therein." Although no duty owed by accountants to the investing public had ever been implied under section 17(a),' 5 such a
duty exists at common law and under other provisions of the federal
securities laws.
In the leading case establishing common-law limits of
accountant's liability to third parties, UltramaresCorp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co.,'" Chief Judge Cardozo opined that to allow recovery
for mere negligence would place too great a burden on the accounting profession, and required a showing of intentional misconduct.
Although this requirement was not disturbed for many years,' 7 the
position adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts" and the
12. See note 5 supra.
13. SEC Release No. 8172, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC L. REP.
77,475, at 82,947, states: "The Audit Requirements have been expanded to require the independent public accountant to comment on any material inadequacies found to exist in the
accounting systems, the internal accounting control, and procedures for safekeeping securities
and to report on any corrective action taken or proposed."
14. According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a material
inadequacy in the internal accounting controls can be defined as "a condition that would
permit a person acting individually in the brokerage concern's organization to perpetrate
errors or irregularities involving the accounting records, assets of the brokerage concern,
and/or assets of customers that would not be detected through the internal control procedures
in time to prevent material loss . . . ." AMERICAN INSTrrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccOUNTANTS, AUDITS OF BROKERS AND DEALERS IN SECuTnREs 71 (1963).
15. In Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966),
the court held that § 17 provided no remedy for alleged violation of the Act. In SEC enforcement actions, however, courts have found a limited remedy created by this section. E.g.,
Stead v. SEC, 444 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1971); Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1965).
16. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
17. See, e.g., C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955); O'Connor v.
Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937); Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Duro
Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (S. Ct. 1954).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966), in part provides:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a transaction in which he has pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) By the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he
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current trend would allow nonprivy plaintiffs to recover for damage
caused by a defendant's negligence upon a showing of reliance and
membership in a class whose reliance was foreseen."
The federal securities laws provide liability for accountants'
misrepresentations in both section 11 of the Securities Act of 193320
and section 18 of the 1934 Act.2' When a plaintiff is not in privity,
however, the violation usually takes the form of aiding and abetting
a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 22 under which the courts
have implied a private civil action for damages against any person
who participates in acts of fraud or makes a false or misleading
statement by omitting a material fact in connection with securities
transactions.? In an early case dealing with aiding and abetting a
violation of Rule 10b-5, Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,2' the
court refused to dismiss a claim against a nonprivy defendant, stating that "knowing assistance of . . . a fraudulent scheme under
Section 10(b) gives rise to liability equal to that of the perpetrators
themselves ....
"25 In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. ,2 the court relied on Pettit and adopted the accepted tort
standard for aiding and abetting, holding that one is liable to a third
party for harm done by another if he "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself."27 Although in
intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply

it; and
(b) Through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the information
to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar
transaction.
19. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971).

20. Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970), creates liability for false or
deceptive statements in a registration statement, and accountants as experts may be included
in its provisions. See Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
21. Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), imposes liability
on any person who makes misleading statements in documents filed with the SEC. Since
reliance must be shown and since plaintiffs rarely see these documents, it is usually impossible to establish a cause of action under § 18. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2d 100 (Sth Cir. 1970); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. See generally Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. LAw. 167,168
(1974).
23. E.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
24. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

25. Id. at 28.
26. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702
(N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970).
27. 259 F. Supp. at 680; RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 876(b) (1939).
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Brennan the defendant had actual knowledge and gave positive
assistance,2 8 the court noted that inaction might constitute substantial assistance,2 9 and on appeal the Ninth Circuit indicated that
knowledge might be established by inference." In defining the limits
of aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5, the courts since
Brennan generally have focused their attention on the elements of
knowledge and substantial assistance.3 1
As actual knowledge has been alleged in most securities law
cases of aiding and abetting, few courts have found it necessary to
comment at length upon the degree of knowledge required.32 In the
few cases that have dealt with the issue, however, an erosion of the
actual knowledge requirement has occurred. In two actions brought
by the SEC, the Second 33 and Sixth Circuits 34 have indicated that
less than actual knowledge is sufficient. In SEC v. First Securities
Company,3 5 the Seventh Circuit also stated that liability could arise
when less than actual knowledge was present 3 - a position that the
court repeated in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange.3 7 In the
latter case, defendant Midwest was found to have fulfilled its duty
of inquiry implicit in section 6 of the 1934 Act, 3 but the court went
on to state that an action for aiding and abetting can be sustained
if the defendant knew or, but for a breach of a duty of inquiry,
should have known of the fraud.
The Brennan requirement of substantial assistance also has
been eroded over the years. The Ninth Circuit in Wessel v. Buhler3'
28. At trial it was disclosed that officers of the corporate defendant knew that a registered securities broker was dealing fraudulently with money obtained from his customers for
purchase of defendant's stock, but nevertheless referred inquiring customers of the broker
first to the broker rather than to the state's securities commission. 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
Ind. 1968).
29. 259 F. Supp. at 682.
30. 417 F.2d at 149.
31. See generally Ruder, Aiding and Abetting, 7 REv. SEc. REG. 882 (1974).
32. For a list of aiding and abetting cases in which actual knowledge was present see
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In PariDelicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, at 632 n.155
(1972).
33. SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (in an enforcement proceeding
an attorney who negligently prepared an opinion letter was found guilty of aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5).
34. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974) (although in this case the court found
no duty of inquiry it indicated breach of duty of inquiry would give rise to liability).
35. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 987.
37. 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974).
38. Section 6 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1971), provides that an exchange may
register with the SEC by filing certain statements containing agreements to enforce certain
rules and regulations.
39. 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
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held that mere inaction would not constitute substantial assistance,
but restricted the definition of inaction by distinguishing between
a lack of action and an omission occurring as part of an affirmative
statement." In Landy v. FederalDeposit Insurance Company,'41 in
which the shareholders of a bank sued an accountant for his failure
to discover fraud in preparing certified financial statements for the
bank's board of directors, the Third Circuit relied upon Wessel and
held that while mere inaction would not constitute substantial assistance, if a "special relationship" existed between the parties mere
inaction would suffice. Although the Seventh Circuit has not given
a definitive ruling on the question, in Drake v. Thor Power Tool
Co.42 it did recognize a special relationship of the type suggested in
Landy - the relationship that exists between investors and independent public auditors. 43 The erosion that has taken place since
Brennan has led one commentator to define the elements of aiding
and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5 as a breach of duty of inquiry
and breach of duty of disclosure, requiring neither actual knowledge
nor substantial assistance."
The final element of aiding and abetting about which the circuit courts have disagreed is whether plaintiff must show that he
relied on defendant's work or whether a showing that defendant's
negligence was causally connected with his injuries will suffice. 45
The Third Circuit in Landy apparently required reliance, having
stressed that none of the plaintiffs saw defendant's misleading report. 4 Although the status of reliance in the Seventh Circuit is
unclear, the court noted in Drake that accountants should not be
immunized from liability under Rule 10b-5 since the accountants'
activities pursuant to the 1934 Act are designed to protect investors.47 Prior to the instant decision no court had clearly defined the
elements required for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5,
nor had any court allowed recovery under the common law for negligent misrepresentation absent a showing of reliance on the
accountant's statement by a plaintiff.
40. Id. at 283.
41.
42.

486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).

43. Id. at 104.
44. Ruder, supra note 31, at 885.
45. For a discussion of reliance as an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation see Stoll,
Reliance as an Element in 10b-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169 (1974).
46. 486 F.2d at 170.
47. 282 F. Supp. at 104.
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THE INSTANT OPINION

After initially rejecting plaintiffs' common-law claim because
neither foreseeability nor reliance could be established, the instant
court focused its attention on the statutory cause of action and
stated that to maintain an action for aiding and abetting a Rule
10b-5 violation, plaintiffs must show first, that defendant had a
duty of inquiry, secondly that plaintiffs were beneficiaries of that
duty, thirdly that concomitant with the duty of inquiry was a duty
to disclose, fourthly that defendant breached these duties, and
lastly that defendant's breaches were causally connected with the
facilitation of the underlying violation of Rule 10b-5. As to the first
element, the court said that a statutory duty of inquiry was imposed
on defendant when it agreed to audit First Securities' financial records and prepare Form X-17A-5. Reasoning that the entire thrust
of the Act was the protection of investors, the court found that this
duty inured to the benefit of investors such as the plaintiffs. The
court next concluded that Rule 17a-5 contained the requisite duty
of disclosure and that although this duty was only implicit in Rule
17a-5 and Form X-17A-5, it was made express by SEC Release No.
8172. Since defendant certified the financial statement without
mentioning any material inadequacy, the court stated that any
breach of defendant's duty of inquiry would necessitate a finding
that defendant also breached this duty of disclosure. The court next
addressed itself to the determination of the standard of care applicable in deciding whether defendant had breached its statutory duty
of inquiry. Reasoning that in performing an audit, an accountant is
"required to meet only the standard of care reasonably expected of
persons holding themselves out as skilled accountants," the court
stated that the statutory standard of care expressed in Form X-17A548 - that the audit shall be made in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards - did not differ from the duty otherwise imposed by law.49 Applying this analysis to the facts of the case,
the court concluded that the fundamental issue was whether defendant conducted its audit with due care in accordance with generally
48. See note 5 supra.
49. In rejecting plaintiffs' contention that failure to discover First Securities' noncompliance with Rule 27(c) of N.A.S.D. also constituted a breach of duty, the court noted that
the profession did not require such an intensive investigation. The court added, however, that
it was not constrained by standards set by the profession if these were found to be inadequate.
The court also rejected defendant's defenses of estoppel and running of the statute of limitations, stating that the jury must decide if plaintiffs' prior conduct constituted estoppel and
that the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the
fraud.
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accepted auditing standards. Relying on affidavits of three respected accountants and statements published by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants," the court concluded that
jury findings were necessary on two genuine issues of material fact:
whether the mail rule was a material inadequacy and whether defendant failed to exercise due care by failing to disclose this material
inadequacy. As to the final element of the cause of action, the court
stated that to show a causal connection plaintiff must show that the
exercise of due care by defendant would have lead to the discovery
of the fraud. The court noted that if defendant had reported the
existence of the mail rule it might have been possible for defendant,
the SEC, or some other self-regulatory agency to uncover the underlying fraud; this it said also required a jury determination. Thus,
the instant court held as a matter of law that pursuant to section
17(a) of the 1934 Act accountants have duties of inquiry and disclosure, which inure to the benefit of the investing public, and that any
factual issues concerning the existence of a breach of duty and a
causal connection between the breach and the injury must be determined by the finder of fact whose affirmative decision would establish liability for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision is of major importance because it clearly
defines a more liberal standard for aiding and abetting under section 10(b), reads a requirement of due care by accountants into
section 17(a), and serves as an additional warning to the accounting
profession of its expanding responsibilities in the field of securities
regulation. By establishing negligence, duty to disclose, and causal
connection, rather than actual knowledge, substantial assistance,
and reliance, as the major elements of aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5, the Seventh Circuit has given this cause of action
the broadest interpretation to date. Nothing precluded this interpretation because private civil remedies under-Rule 10b-5 are themselves creations of the courts. This decision, the outcome of which
had been predicted by one commentator,' may be viewed as the
culmination of a liberalizing trend that began in Brennan. Since
these elements are defined in the abstract, they should apply in the
Seventh Circuit in all aiding and abetting actions brought under the
1934 Act. The novel interpretation of section 17(a)52 to define the
50. See AmmcAN INsTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBLc ACCOUNTANTS, Statements on Auditing
Procedure No. 33, in AuDrrING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 10-11, 16, 28 (1963).
51.
52.

Ruder, supra note 31.
Congressional history reveals no desire on the part of Congress to create a legal
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scope of duty owed by the profession to the investing public is particularly significant to the accounting profession. The scope of the
duty imposed by this section, however, is not new; the instant court
requires only that accountants use the standard of care set by their
profession - disclosure of any material inadequacy and refusal to
certify a misleading financial report. This duty of care corresponds
to that of the modern requirement for common-law negligent misrepresentation. The section 17(a) statutory action differs in that it
does not require reliance, but merely a causal connection. Although
this will expose the accounting profession to increased litigation,
discarding the reliance requirement is reasonable when viewed in
the context of the 1934 Act. The responsibility for auditing and
certifying financial reports was placed upon the accounting profession in response to its own demands and the SEC has given the
profession considerable freedom in setting its standards." Implicit,
however, in the requirement that such reports be prepared and certified is the assumption that they are accurate, or at least that due
care was used in their preparation and in the subsequent audit.
Recognizing that the SEC requires these statements for the protection of the investing public, the Seventh Circuit acknowledges the
reliance that investors place on independent public accountants and
an implied foreseeability that negligence in this area exposes the
entire class of investors to injury. Given this relationship, the requirement that the investor merely show a causal connection is not
too extreme a departure from common-law foreseeability and reliance. With this decision the Seventh Circuit has issued a warning
that in preparing and auditing reports filed with the SEC pursuant
to the Act, the accounting profession must establish and follow
responsible standards or be faced with civil liability. This threat of
aider and abettor status hopefully will serve as a force motivating
the independent accountant to resist an unscrupulous client's presobligation for accountants under § 17 of the Act. See Hearings on S.R. 56 and S.R. 97 Before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6561-62, 6637, 6673,
6716-17, 6726, 6841, 6914, 6993, 7043, 7484, 7489, 7529 (1934); Hearingson H.R. 7852 and H.R.
8720 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
225, 262, 536, 666, 670, 750, 804 (1934). Congress provided for a remedy under § 18 of the Act.
See note 21 supra.
53. 2 J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION TO RESPONSIBILITY AND
AUTHoRrrY 1-19 (1970). Although the court recognizes that compliance with generally ac-

cepted standards constitutes the standard of care, it does not feel that it should be constrained by standards that it feels are too lax. See note 49 supra. Thus, even though an
accountant follows accepted procedure he may still be liable if the procedure is found to be
inadequate. Other cases have similarly held. E.g., United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp.

66 (E.D. N.Y. 1969).
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sure on him to either bend the rules or look the other way. This can
only help to increase the independence of the profession and afford
even greater protection to the investing public.
GREGG

N.

GRIMSLEY

